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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL
the complainant. 74 In a case of the latter type, the owner must be prejudiced in
some way or mislead by the mistake in the description before he can complain of
the assessment.
ROaERT A.

McKAY.

GRoss PRODUCTS TAX
According to the weight of authority, a tax imposed on persons for severing
natural resources from the soil, based upon either the quantity or the value of the
product severed, is valid. Such a tax, according to the majority view, is a privilege
or occupation tax and not subject to the constitutional requirements relating to
the imposition of property taxes.1
In Wyoming, a tax upon mineral products has been specifically provided for
by the State Constitution.2 This provision expressly gives the legislature power
to impose a tax upon all mines and mining claims, based upon the gross products
thereof. It further provides that this tax is to be in lieu of all taxes on the lands
upon which the mine is located. The tax is to be levied only while the mines are
being worked or operated and should be in addition to any tax which may be
assessed upon the surface improvements of the claim. 3
The question arises in Wyoming, under the Constitutional and statutory
provisions referred to,1 as to what the nature of the tax upon mine products may
be. The question first arose in Miller v. Buck Creek Oil Co.,5 where it was stated
that the tax is evidently a property tax rather than a license, privilege or occupation tax. However, the discussion by the court on this point was merely by way
of dictum and by no means conclusive, which fact was recognized when the issue
arose for the second time in the Federal Court.6 In referring to the Buck Creek
case, the court was of the opinion that the Wyoming Supreme Court leans toward
the doctrine announced by so many other courts, that minerals when severed from
the land become personal property and are taxable as such.7 Perhaps this is a
logical conclusion in view of the holding in the Buck Creek case that a portion of
the products tax should be paid by the lessee of the property, which indicates that
the tax is upon the property after it becomes severed from the land.
The latest and most conclusive argument holding the gross products tax to be
a personal property tax was set forth in Board of Com'rs of Sweetwater County,
Wyo., et al. v.*Bernardin et al.R In this case, it was urged that the gross products
tax was a tax on the realty measured by the gross mineral product thereof. It was
here pointed out 9 that if this were true, the amended section of the gross products
74. Ricketts v. Crewdson, see note 5 supra.
1. 32 A.L.R. 827.

2. Wyo. State Const. Art. 15, sec. 3.
3. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-1001.

4. Ibid. 2 and 3.
5. 38 Wyo. 505, 269 Pac. 43 (1928).
6. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Central Coal & Coke Co. et al., 3 F. Supp. 433
(D. Wyo. 1933).
7. Ibid at 436.
8.74 F. (2d) 809 (D. Wyo. 1934).
9. Ibid at 813.
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tax statute, 10 providing that the tax could be enforced against the land
was wholly unnecessary, and the amended section therefore amounted to a
legislative construction of section 3, art. 15, Wyo. Const.,l1 that the tax is upon
the severed products. The court felt this construction would be more beneficial
to the state because much oil and other minerals produced in Wyoming are derived
from lands of the United States and of this state, which are exempt from taxation.
This argument carries much weight and has been applied in other states)2
as a basis for holding a tax on mineral production to be a property tax. The
Illuminating Oil case arose after Oklahoma had attempted to levy its gross production tax upon mines being operated by the Choctaw Indians.13 The Oklahoma
courts held this to be an occupation tax and a valid levy. However, upon appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States the Oklahoma decision was reversed
and it was held that a Federal Agency could not be subjected to an occupation or
privilege tax by a state, but on the other hand, the right of the state to levy an
ad valorem tax on the personal property of such instrumentality was expressly
recognized.
In view of this opinion, the State of Oklahoma revised their gross products
tax and when the question as to its nature again arose in the Illuminating Oil case,
it was held to be a property rather than a privilege or occupation tax. This decision was obviously necessary due to the fact that Oklahoma is the situs of
numerous Federal Agencies and the gross products tax, as a revenue measure,
could only be effective if classified as a property tax.
As pointed out in the Bernirdin case, Wyoming's problem in classifying their
gross products tax was similar to that of Oklahoma's. The court, being well
aware of the fact that much of Wyoming's land was controlled by the Federal
and State instrumentalities, wished to construe the tax in such a manner as to be
most beneficial to the state as a revenue producer. Since Federal and State lands
are exempt from taxation and a state cannot subject a Federal Agency to a privilege or occupation tax, the obvious conclusion was to hold it to be a personal
property tax. This result allows a valid imposition upon all minerals after being
extracted from the realty, regardless of the nature or ownership of the land.
However, the fact still remains that a majority of jurisdictions hold such a
tax to be a privilege, occupation or license tax and it will be well worth while to
consider some of these opinions and the reasons for reaching a different result than
that found to exist in Wyoming.
10. The Special Session of the Wyoming Legislature in Dec., 1933 (Chapter 54), amended
section 115-601, Wyo. Rev. St. 1931, now section 32-1001 W.C.S., 1945, by adding:
"And said tax shall be a first and prior lien upon the products so levied upon, and
the tax thus levied shall be collected from the person against whom the same was
levied, if such person has real or personal property within the State, out of which
payment may be enforced, and it shall be the duty of the County Treasurer by distraint, attachment or otherwise, to first endeavor to collect the tax from the person
assessed therefore; provided, however, that if the tax cannot be so collected, said
tax may be enforced against the land from which such products shall be extracted,
and said tax from the date of its assessment shall be a lien on the land."
11. See note 2, supra.
12. In Re Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 43 Okla. 307, 142 Pac. 997 (1914). Reversed on other grounds.
13. Chotaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27 (1914).
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In Louisiana, the state Constitution expressly provided for a tax upon natural
resources. 14 It provided that such natural resources may be classified for the purposes of taxation and rate of taxation could be predicated upon the quantity or
value of the product at the time and place of severance. The Louisiana Legislature thereafter enacted a statutel 5 which provided in substance that taxes on
natural resources shall be predicated on the quantity severed; and for the purpose
of oil, the rate was based upon the gravity of the oil. This statute was attacked
on the ground that this attempted classification of oil, for the purpose of taxation,
was wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and that it completely ignored the market
value of the oil produced which varies widely in different oil fields of the state.
The court heldl6 that the tax was undoubtedly an excise or privilege tax as distinguished from an ad valorem or property tax and was not affected by general
constitutional requirements for equality and uniformity. The court felt this point
to be so well settled that the remaining portion of the opinion was spent in upholding gravity as a basis of classification for the purpose of taxation.
The New Mexico Constitution1 7 reads, "Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal and
uniform upon subjects of the same class." The New Mexico Legislaturel8 levied
a tax upon oil and gas severed from the soil and provided that the tax so levied
.hould be predicated upon the quantity severed. It was allegedl9 that this statute.
was unconstitutional because the tax was measured by quantity rather than value,
as prescribed by the New Mexico Constitution. The court thereon 2O defined an
excise tax as follows: "Any tax is an 'excise,' which is not a capitiation tax, or a
direct tax on land or personalty, considered as the permanent fortune of the individual taxed, and laid thereon solely by reason of ownership without regard to
origin or the actual or intended use to which it may be put; in other words, a
perennial tax upon property as such."
In view of this definition it was held that the oil may remain underground
forever as part of the landowner's permanent wealth and of the states permanent
taxable resource, without being affected by this tax. The producer or severer,
after once suffering the exaction, may hold it as long as he will without a recurrence of it. The tax is tied absolutely to the act or privilege of producing or
severing. It is not imposed because of ownership. True, it burdens ownership,
but for that matter, so does a sale, a use or a consumption tax. The tax is an excise
tax and well within the state's large powers in matters of taxation. Therefore,
the Constitutional limitations relating to property taxes did not apply and if the
legislature desired to use quantity rather than values as a basis for the tax, they
were justified in so doing.
In view of the holdings in the Buck Creek and Bernardin cases, it is unneces14. See. 21 Art. 10 Const. of La.
15. Act. No. 140 of 1922.
16. Ohio Oil Co. v. McFarland, 28 F. (2d) 441 (E. D. La. 1928). Reversed in the
opinion of Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U. S. 813, on a practice question.
17. N. M. Const. Art. 9 sec. 1.
18. Ch. 72 N. M. Session Laws of 1933.
19. Flynn, Welch and Yates, Inc. v. State Tax Comm. et al., 38 N. M. 131, 23 P. (2d)
889 (1934).
20. Ibid at 892.
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sary to pursue this question any further. Many other casesl could be discussed
at length which uphold the majority view that a tax upon natural resources is a
privilege or occupation tax. The obvious purpose of these latter 'decisions is to
circumvent the strict constitutional limitations placed upon the levy and assessment of property taxes; and in some states, due to the strict construction placed
upon constitutional provisions relating to taxation by the various courts, 22 such
resort is absolutely necessary because these courts regard all property as homogeneous for the purpose of taxation. This has the effect of precluding the legislatures
from classifying minerals for tax purposes and due to the fact that mines and
mining claims are wasting assets they must be separately classified or removed
altogether from the broad field of a property tax in order to fairly and adequately
bear their just proportions of the revenue required by a state. Wyoming is not
within this latter class; that fact coupled with the reasoning of the Bernardin
case may well justify the conclusion that the gross products tax is a personal property tax in Wyoming.
With this conclusion in mind, it will be convenient at this point to examine
and determine what constitutional provisions must be complied with in taxing
mine products as personal property.
The Wyoming Constitution sets forth two limitations upon uniformity, ...
"all taxation shall be equal and uniform... ;"23 it further provides that "all property, except as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be uniformly assessed
for taxation, and the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a
just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal."24
Under provisions similar to these, statutes classifying property on the basis
of the clearest distinction possible, real and personal, may be unconstitutional for
want of uniformity in one jurisdiction and valid in another. This result comes
about by some courts taking the view that all property is homogeneous for the
purpose of taxation, and that exemption or classification of one kind of property
creates an undue burden on the type of property taxed.2 5 Therefore, the jurisdictions have been split into two distinct groups by the different construction placed
upon constitutional provisions relating to uniformity. For the purpose of convenience, they may be labeled as the "strict" and "liberal" types.
Under the "strict" type, the following regulations and provisions have been
held to be void for want of uniformity: a provision attempting to exempt all personal property belonging to interurban railroad companies from the general tax
list ;26 a proposed tax imposing a different rate of taxation of certain intangibles
than on other types of property ;27 an assessment of bank shares at 90 per cent of
cash value, where other property was assessed at 75 per cent of cash value. 2 8
21. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 43
Parker, 5 Ala. App. 231, 59 So. 741 (1912) ; Floyd et
160 Ark. 17, 254- S. W. 450 (1923) ; Mid-Northern
These cases are merely
414, 211 Pac. 353 (1922).
haustive list.

Sup. Ct. 526 (1923); State v.
al. v. Miller Lumber Co. et al.,
Oil Co. v. Walker, 65 Mont.
representative and not an ex-

22. See note 25, infra.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Wyo. Const. Art. 1, sec. 28.
Wyo. Const. Art. 15, see. 11.
2 Ky. L. J. 198 (1950).
State v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N. E. (2d) 684 (1937).
Opinion of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607, 84 N. E. 499 (1908).
Boonville Nat. Bank v. Schlotzhauer, 317 Mo. 1298, 298 S. W. 732 (1927).
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The consequences of such decisions can be avoided only by amending the
constitution or by finding that the purpose of uniformity is not to require that all
property be taxed, but rather that it contemplates exemptions and classifications.
Wyoming may be used as a typical example of those jurisdications following
the "liberal" type of classification. Within a few years after the ratification of
the Wyoming Constitution, the Supreme Court, in construing the uniformity provisions of our constitution,29 held, "The sovereignty may, in the discretion of its
legislature, levy a tax on every species of property within its jurisdiction, or, on
the other hand, it may select any particular species of property, and tax that
only, if, in the opinion of the legislature, that course will be wiser. This is true
not only of property but of privileges and occupations also. The state may tax
all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave others
untaxed . . . to
be uniform, taxation need not be universal. Certain objects may be made its
subject, and others may be exempted from its operation. Uniformity merely
obliges the legislature to impose an equal burden upon all those who find them30
selves in the same class."
It necessarily follows that Wyoming is justified in placing mining property
as well as the business of mining in a class by itself and taxing it by some method
peculiarly appropriate to that class; such is a valid exercise of the constitutional
right on the part of the legislature, and needs the citation of no authorities in its
support.
Therefore, by authority of the Willingham case, it is quite clear that if the
legislature so desires, they may divide all the minerals and natural resources
referred to in the gross products statute-) into different classes for the purpose
of taxation, including a class which exempts them from taxation altogether. Thus,
3
in determining whether or not gypsite should be subject to the gross products tax Z
it was held, "Whether a mineral deposit is subject to the production tax should
be determined by whether it can reasonably be said, considering all economic
factors, that the value of the material is, in the long run and not for one year
merely, such as to be able to reasonably bear the production tax in addition to
taxes assessed against the manufacturer."3 3 The court recognized that such determination should lie wholly within the power of the legislature, but because of
their lack of initiative to act upon the matter, the case was disposed of by the court
on the ground that the assessment on gypsite was so high as to result in constructive fraud.
It is readily seen that if this case had arisen in one of the "strict" jurisdictions,
a gross injustice would have resulted merely because the courts and legislatures
refuse to exempt from taxation any property, regardless of the so called "public
interests" involved.
The decision in the Certain-Teed case is illustrative of the proposition that
no definite rule can be laid down for determining whether a particular classificaState v. Willingham, 9 Wyo. 290, 62 Pac. 797 (1900).
Ibid at 798.
See note 3, supra.
Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Comly, County Assessor et aI., 54 Wyo. 79, 87 P.
(2d) 21 (1939).
33. Ibid at 26.

29.
30.
31.
32.
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tion for tax purposes in reasonable or arbitrary, and this question must be decided
upon the facts and circumstances appearing in each particular case. It is, however,
important to note that in making such determination the legislature has the
judicial sanction to taking into consideration such elements as "public interest"
and "public policy." These elements, standing alone, give the legislature a wide
latitude of discretion in determining the subjects of taxation, the kinds of property to be taxed, the rates to be levied and the methods of assessment, valuation
and collection; all of which are included within the power to classify.
Perhaps the legislature's right to classify may best be illustrated by Heisler
v. Thomas Colliery Co.,34 in which it was held that the difference between anthracite and bituminous coal warrants a state in placing them in different classes
for the purpose of taxation. This distinction presents a close question and the
35
exact point has been decided contrary to the holding of the Heisler case.
It is unnecessary to discuss the decisions of these two cases, but it should be
noted that while the legislative classification must be based upon real and substantial differences, they 'do not, however, need to be great or conspicuous.
As already pointed out earlier, the courts have substantially justified their
decisions that the gross products tax is a personal property tax, and in view of
the liberal construction placed upon the constitutional limitations regarding property taxes and the wide discretion given to the legislature in taxing property, it
may reasonably be concluded that this type of tax on mine products has adequately
met the desired end of enhancing the state's revenue while its natural wealth is
being depleted.
HARRY L. HARRIS.

TAx LIEN PRIORITY IN WYOMING
Tax liens were unknown to the common law of the United States and
England.1 Today they do not exist unless they are expressly provided for by
statute or constitution, 2 and being creatures of express legislative intent and action
are not to be enlarged by construction3 The Constitution of the State of Wyoming makes no provision for a tax lien. However, such a tax lien is expressly
provided for by statute. 4 The legislature of the State of Wyoming has seen fit
to go further than the mere creation of a tax lien.
It has granted to the lien which attaches to personalty and realty as security
for the collection of general state, county, and school taxes priority over all other
outstanding encumbrances as against all persons except the United States and the
State of Wyoming itself.5 Such a provision that the lien for general taxes shall
260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83 (1923).
Commonwealth v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. 134, 96 A. 246 (1915).
Ingraham v. Forman, 49 Ariz. 29, 63 P.(2d) 998 (1937).
Lobban v. State ex. rel. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 377, 64 Pac. 82 (1901) ; Wakeman v.
Board of Comm'rs of Weston County, 40 Wyo. 53, 274 Pac. 12 (1929).
3. Lobban v. State ex. rel. Carpenter, supra note 2.
4. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 32-601.
5. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 32-1603.

34.
35.
1.
2.

